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LESSONS UNLEARNED: WOMEN OFFENDERS,
THE ETHICS OF CARE, AND THE PROMISE OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Marie A. Failinger *
Latasha, the child of an alcoholic father and herself an alcohol abuser by
thirteen, was arrested at nineteen after she hit a police officer with a
baseball bat. 1 The officer was attempting to arrest her when she tried to
take her child back from her boyfriend and his new girlfriend and instead
ended up assaulting the girlfriend’s mother.2 It was Latasha’s second
assault arrest. 3 Latasha’s mother, who separated from her father at ten,
described Latasha as incorrigible; she said Latasha’s father “screwed up
Latasha by using her to get back at me.” 4
Chris, a twenty-two year-old woman, was arrested for permitting her
husband to sexually abuse her five and nine-year-old nieces. 5 Chris’s
father was an alcoholic and was abusive to his wife and children. Once he
pushed Chris’s mother down the stairs, breaking her arm, while another
time, he beat her brother so badly that his eardrums were broken.6 In
addition, he hit Chris so hard that it caused her speech to be
“unintelligible,” and as a result, she was described as “‘nervous’ and
slightly retarded.” 7 She was placed in special education classes after the
second grade, and was “easily led.” 8 When she was twenty-one, she

*

Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. My thanks goes to my colleague,
Howard Vogel, who made suggestions on a draft of this paper; my student Dawn O’Rourke,
whose seminar paper on gender disparities in sentencing encouraged me to consider these
issues; Scott Michael, who served as my research assistant on this project; and Harriet
Manis, who shared her experiences in the corrections system with me.
1. Kathleen Daly, Women’s Pathways to Felony Court: Feminist Theories of
Lawbreaking and Problems of Representation, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 11, 31
(1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 34.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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married a thirty-five-year-old trucker. In accounting for her failure to stop
her husband’s abuse of the children, Chris suggested that she acted to
please her husband, so he would love her.9
Betsey, a twenty-three-year-old woman, was a drug abuser whose face
was scarred from injuries she received when she was pushed out of a
moving car while turning a “trick.” 10 Betsy burned her scalp when she
improperly applied a delousing salve to kill the imaginary vermin that she
thought were crawling in her hair during a drug overdose. 11 She was
arrested for possession of drugs, carrying a concealed weapon, checkforgery, fencing stolen goods—crimes she admitted to but was never
charged for—as well as a robbery she claims she did not commit.12
Betsey’s mother left her abusive father, who had taunted her by saying that
Betsey would have “ninety-nine kids” before she got out of school. 13 As a
result, she forced Betsey to wear unattractive clothes, attend church twice
on Sundays, and stay home at night. 14 After Betsey dropped out of school,
her live-in boyfriend’s mother, Marlene, encouraged her to work in
prostitution in the streets near a naval base.15 Marlene’s “man” (who
prostituted her) introduced Betsey to her “man,” and Betsey and her man’s
two “wives-in-law”(other prostitutes with relationships with the same man)
worked together in Milwaukee, Memphis, Nashville, and Florida. 16 She
went through many men in her descent into drugs, and she was particularly
touched by one man who tried to help her get off drugs without asking
anything in return; however, he was ultimately imprisoned for forgery. 17
The steep rise in female offenders since the 1960s 18 has finally caused

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
See ELEANOR M. MILLER, STREET WOMAN 54 (1986).
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 58-59.
See id. at 61.
See RONALD BARRIE FLOWERS, WOMEN AND CRIMINALITY: THE WOMAN AS VICTIM,
OFFENDER AND PRACTITIONER 78-79 (1987). Flowers notes that arrests of women have
steadily increased since 1960, with the most prominent increases occurring between 196075, including a one-thousand percent increase in drug arrests, and other increases for stolen
property, fraud, weapons, and driving under the influence. Id. at 79-80. Steffensmeier and
Allen suggest that there has been a substantial increase in women’s arrests, from eleven
percent of arrests in 1960 to nineteen percent in 1995, with the bulk of the increase in
property crimes such as larceny, fraud, and forgery (e.g., from fifteen percent of arrests in
1960 to forty percent in 1995). By contrast, arrests for homicide, aggravated assault, and
drug violations have declined. Id. at 10; Darrel Steffensmeier & Emilie Allan, The Nature
of Female Offending: Patterns and Explanations in FEMALE OFFENDERS: CRIMINAL
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criminologists, lawyers, judges, and others to consider why they have not
learned more about women offenders’ lives, in order to better understand
and explain why they enter, and how they proceed through the criminal
system. 19 The rise in women’s crime is particularly confounding because
the overall crime rate has dropped. 20 Between 1990 and 1996, the state
court convictions of women increased forty-two percent for felonies, thirtyseven percent for drug offenses, and thirty percent for violent felonies,
while the overall crime rates in the same courts have dropped
significantly. 21 There also has been an “explosion” in the number of
incarcerated women. Prior to the war on drugs, about two-thirds of the
women were put on probation and they represented less than five percent of
the inmate population, however, by 1998, seven-and-a-half percent of all
federal inmates were women, and seventy-two percent of them were drug
offenders. 22
The study of these disturbing statistics has resulted in a number of
theories that try to explain the recent increase in the number of women in
prison. 23 Some suggest that the increase can be attributed to the economic
instability of single-parent families that many women offenders head. 24
Others argue that the turn toward mandatory sentencing for drug offenses
has affected women the most, because they are least likely to be able to
PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 9-10 (Ruth Zaplin ed., 1998); Leslie Acoca &
Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: The Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and
their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 133, 138 (1999).
19. See generally Myrna S. Raeder, Creating Correctional Alternatives for Nonviolent
Women Offenders and Their Children, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 377 (2000) (noting national
news and Department of Justice attention to this topic).
20. See Jennifer Ward, Snapshots: Holistic Images of Female Offenders in the Criminal
Justice System, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723, 723 (2003).
21. Id. at 723 n.1.
22. See Raeder, supra note 19, at 379-80. Raeder also notes that by mid-1998, America
housed eighty thousand women in prison and sixty-four thousand in local jails. Id. at 37980.
23. For a brief summary of the history of these theories, see Ward, supra note 20, at
726-28. Ward describes three types of theories, centering on psychology, biology, and
socioeconomics. For example, Konopka focused on puberty, identification with one’s
mother, changes in women’s social positions, and “indistinctive authority resulting from low
self-esteem and loneliness” as critical conditions in women’s criminality. Id. at 727-28. By
contrast, Eleanor and Sheldon Glueck suggested that environment and biological conditions
had significant effects on offenders’ chances of being rehabilitated. Id. at 728. Ward
herself notes that female offenders commit less serious crimes than men, are more often
victims of past physical or sexual abuse, play a greater role in caring for minor children,
have less economic stability, and are more problematic as substance abusers. Id. at 730.
24. See, e.g., FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 99-100, 122. Raeder notes that the vast
majority of women in correctional facilities have children, and that perhaps two-hundred
thousand children in the United States have incarcerated mothers. Raeder, supra note 19, at
380.
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trade information for a reduced sentence.25 Still others point to the increase
in incarceration rates for non-violent offenses that women traditionally
engage in, such as larceny, fraud, embezzlement, and shoplifting, as part of
the gender equalization trend pushed by uniform sentencing guidelines. 26
Lauren Snider argues that the feminist alteration of frameworks of
meaning that reject the traditional passive “woman in trouble” stereotype
has created a new sort of paradigm of the female criminal. 27 Whether she
actually exists or not, the new paradigmatic woman of criminal policy
discourse is the “predatory, rational, calculating Female Criminal, the
violent gang girl, 28 or the irresponsible, out-of-control Bad Mother/Child
Abuser” who “justifies the surge of punitiveness reflected in incarceration

25. See, e.g., Lauren Snider, Constituting the Punishable Woman: Atavistic Man
Incarcerates Postmodern Woman, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 354, 368 (2003); see also
FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 100; Eda Katharine Tinto, The Role of Gender and Relationship
in Reforming the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 909-14, 933 (2001)
(describing “inverted sentencing” and noting that in the nine years following the passage of
mandatory drug laws in New York, the number of women in prison went up 156 percent as
compared to a rise of only forty-nine percent for men); Patricia M. Wald, Why Focus on
Women Offenders?, CRIM. JUST. Spring 2001 at 10, 12. For a brief history of impetus
behind this change, see Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism and the Procedural
Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 255-57; see also Cassidy Kesler,
Where Women Fit: Gender and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Summary, 15 FED. SENT.
R. 192 (2003) (noting that women offenders commit mostly non-violent offenses and thus
are less likely to receive full downward adjustments because of acceptance of responsibility,
which applies to higher-level offenses).
26. See Acoca & Raeder, supra note 18, at 134 (explaining rising rates as due to
mandatory minimums, sentencing reform movements, and “get tough on crime”
campaigns); Raeder, supra note 19, at 380 (noting that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
mandate that “family ties and responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
range”); see also Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note 18, at 11 (noting that the targeting of
serious forms of lawbreaking has increased arrests of female offenders). Mary-Christine
Sungaila notes, however, that while sex cannot be taken into consideration, some genderbased circumstances can be taken into consideration, such as the reality of duress by the
female offender’s boyfriend or husband. See Mary Christine Sungaila, Taking the Gendered
Realities of Female Offenders Into Account: Downward Departures for Coercion and
Duress, 8 FED. SENT. R. 169 (1995).
27. See Snider, supra note 25, at 367-68; Ward, supra note 20, at 728-29; see also
Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note 18, at 10 (debunking the view that the women’s
movement and women’s increased participation in the public sphere have contributed to
more crime by women, noting that typically those women arrested are economically
marginal women who have not reaped the benefits of feminist successes).
28. Steffensmeier and Allen suggest that gang girls have not simply played the role of
secondary players to their men; rather, in many gangs, a women’s status is determined by
their female peers. Gangs play an integral role in initiating girls into violent offending,
although they continue to defer to male gang members and mimic traditional female roles.
Steffensmeier & Allen, supra note 18, at 13-14.

FAILINGER_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:12 PM

LESSONS UNLEARNED

105

rates.” 29 While this paradigm shift may account for the rise in women’s
incarceration, there is no strong evidence that these women do not benefit
as others did in the past from the “chivalry” or “paternalism” of the system
that did not hold women fully accountable. Though some students of the
criminal system have made this charge, others contend that chivalry, if it
existed, worked only in favor of middle-class white women, and that
paternalism does not explain why young women receive more punitive
treatment than men, and fewer procedural protections in the system.30
Judge Patricia Wald argues that women commit the same crimes, but the
means they use are different—e.g., they usually do not carry weapons or
plan the crimes, and they are often coerced into criminal behavior—so their
punishment under a “just deserts” theory should be less severe. 31
Eleanor Miller, by contrast, debunks the argument that the rise in crime
is caused by either single objective factors, such as women’s labor force
participation, or subjective factors, such as new paradigms or women’s
own re-understandings of their sex roles. 32 She suggests, based on “street
women” she interviewed in Milwaukee, that a complicated set of factors
may better account for the increasing visibility of women’s crime. 33 These
factors include marginal workforce participation and accompanying
economic stress, the influence of the men in these women’s lives, the
relationships of their family networks to deviant street networks, and other
factors that are harder to predict such as the thrill of committing crime. 34
Still others who study women’s crimes are focused more on ostensible
cures for crimes rather than causes. They argue that formal equal treatment
of men and women in criminal sentencing, pushed by a liberal agenda, has
in fact obscured the real ways in which women are placed at a disadvantage
in the post-conviction criminal system. On one hand, these writers have
29. See Snider, supra note 25, at 367-68; see also FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 86, 101103 (the findings of Fred Adler and Rita Simon, who suggest that women are coming to
parity with men in terms of type and frequency of criminal behavior).
30. FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 83-84. Flowers notes, however, that some studies show
that women who pleaded not guilty and took their chances at trial did seem to get acquitted
more often for offenses like robbery, burglary, or larceny, and were sentenced to prison less
often. However, he points out that women’s crimes tend to be less violent and any violence
they commit is often unplanned, which may account for sentencing disparities. Id. at 84.
See Raeder, supra note 19, at 379 (noting that minority women were “particularly hard hit”
by mandatory drug minimum sentences, for example, the Hispanic female inmate
population increased seventy-one percent from between 1990 and 1996).
31. Kesler, supra note 25, at *3; see Wald, supra note 25, at 10.
32. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 3-6.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 162, 174, 177-79; see also FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 121 (noting Cesare
Lombroso’s criticism of the new views that women become prostitutes to satisfy a need for
excitement).
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documented actual inequalities in rehabilitation options offered women,
from mental health and employment options in prison, to the provision of
adequate health care that accounts for women’s particular reproductive and
other health risks. 35 For example, Shearer notes that women have fewer
imprisonment options, and are more rarely assigned to prisons based on
their individual treatment needs, the severity of their crime, or issues of
security. 36
On the other hand, those who study the criminal system have
demonstrated how formal equality does not address the real difference in
women’s situations. For example, criminologists have documented that
women in the criminal system are more likely to abuse drugs and alcohol as
a means of medicating themselves in response to the significant physical,
sexual, and emotional violence they experienced as children. 37 Shearer
notes that techniques used to treat male drug abusers, such as group settings
and confrontation, “tend to be threatening to many women and often inhibit
the ability of female substance abusers” to address past physical or sexual
abuse, and feelings of worthlessness or the need to please others.38 In
addition, Judge Wald cites the failure of correctional systems to provide for
gynecological or pregnancy-related health, noting that “postpartum care is
frequently slapdash,” and counseling is rare.39
Moreover, unlike male offenders, most women are caregivers and
supporters of children; more than two-thirds of incarcerated women have
children. 40 Women’s incarceration disrupts not only their own lives, but
35. See FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 156-57 (describing lack of proper medical care, poor
diet, comparatively disadvantageous recreational facilities, and limited vocational and
training programs for women except in “women’s work” such as sewing and cosmetology);
Stephanie S. Covington, The Relational Theory of Women’s Psychological Development:
Implications for the Criminal Justice System, in FEMALE OFFENDERS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 156-57 (Ruth T. Zaplin ed., 1998).
36. See Robert A. Shearer, Identifying the Special Needs of Female Offenders, 67 FED.
PROBATION 46, 46 (2003).
37. See Covington, supra note 35, at 116; Raeder, supra note 19, at 381; Shearer, supra
note 36, at 46. Covington notes that eighty percent of California’s women prisoners were the
victims of adolescent abuse. As children, twenty-nine percent were physically abused,
thirty-one percent were sexually abused, and forty percent were emotionally abused.
Adolescent offender studies suggest similar abuse histories. This abuse, and the resulting
disconnection and violation of these women’s lives, leads to social isolation and a strong
risk of drug abuse. Covington, supra note 35, at 116, 120-21; see also Steffensmeier &
Allen, supra note 18, at 12 (noting the rising levels of drug dependency and subsequent
motivation to commit other crimes to support such habits). They note that women who
cease drug use regularly cease to be involved in burglary and robbery.
38. See Shearer, supra note 36, at 47.
39. See Wald, supra note 25, at 14.
40. See Covington, supra note 20, at 116; Raeder, supra note 5, at 380. Wald notes that
about one-and-a-half million children have at least one parent in prison, since eighty-eight
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also the lives of their children. In addition to increasing the troubling
responsive behavior of children who are torn from their mothers at a young
age, 41 children can literally lose their mothers because of their incarceration
for non-violent offenses. New laws designed to put the children’s interests
first permit parental rights to be terminated more quickly when the mother
is absent. 42 Moreover, few women’s treatment programs embrace the
reality that women need skills to support their children, and to re-learn
interpersonal skills that suffered from their poor relationships with their
children’s fathers. 43
This article focuses on the reality that women’s relationality, and
particularly their relationships with men in their lives,44 profoundly affects
the behavior that lands them in the criminal justice system. Covington has
described how dysfunction in women offenders’ relationships leads to drug
abuse and other crime, and how important it is that women offenders be
treated in relational systems. 45 I argue that restorative justice, which is
essentially grounded on an ethical understanding of crime and treats the
offender as an interacting subject/agent, is a necessary avenue of response
to most women offenders’ crimes, and that corrections must go beyond a
psychological approach that treats crime as a form of illness, or a systemic
model which attempts primarily to rectify deficits in women’s social
situation. My claim is a modest “maybe” in terms of the success of this
approach because, to my knowledge, no systems have studied the relative
long-term effectiveness of treatment-based, services-based, traditional
percent of all offenders have children. In the federal system, she notes, eighty percent of the
women have young dependent children, seventy percent were the primary care parent, and
sixty-six percent were single mothers. Wald supra note 25, at 14.
41. See Wald, supra note 25, at 15; Ward, supra note 20, at 732. Raeder cites Judge
Weinstein’s observation in United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1282 (E.D.N.Y.
1992), that “[r]emoving the mother in such a matriarchal setting destroys the children’s
main source of stability and guidance and enhances the possibility of their engaging in
destructive behavior.” Raeder, supra note 19, at 380.
42. See Raeder, supra note 19, at 381 (noting that the confluence of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997 and increasing drug penalties for women has resulted in the
potential termination of parental rights for virtually all mothers who do not have caretaking
relatives and are incarcerated for more than fifteen months); see also Covington, supra note
35, at 116 (noting that female inmates feel “enormous guilt” about being absent from their
children and worry about whether they will retain custody when they get out).
43. See Shearer, supra note 36, at 47 (discussing the lack of training focusing on
parenting skills and vocational rehabilitation for women).
44. See, e.g., Steffensmeier & Allen, supra note 18, at 16 (noting that women are “far
more likely than males to be motivated by relational concerns and to require a higher level
of provocation before turning to crime”).
45. See Covington, supra note 35, at 113-29; see also Raeder, supra note 19, at 381
(noting that women are disproportionately victimized by sexual and physical abuse, and
more likely than men to be addicts, to be unemployed, and to have mental illness).
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incarceration, and restorative justice approaches on women offenders.
Indeed, restorative justice scholars would argue that “effectiveness” in
restorative processes should not be measured by the usual markers, such as
decrease in recidivism, because its value is in restoring the victim of
criminal behavior first, rather than the punishment or rehabilitation of the
offender. 46 Nonetheless, restoration of the offender to the community and
the creation of a new relationship between the community and both the
victim and the offender are important benefits of restorative approaches.47
It seems that restorative advocates may be right—if these processes
produce justice, the fact that they cannot demonstrate any more
“effectiveness” by traditional markers than the current system is probably
not nearly as important as those involved in correctional system would
advocate. Thus, my argument is essentially an appeal to ethics and
common sense, not statistics, about why restorative systems might be
especially appropriate for those women who approach criminal choices
using what Carol Gilligan describes as an “ethics of care,” rather than an
“ethics of rights.” 48
I. THE RELATIONAL REALITY OF OFFENDERS’ LIVES
Professor Kathleen Daly has given us the stories of Latasha and Chris,
real lawbreakers, in response to what she describes as “the leading feminist
scenario” about the “street woman” that is used to explain why women
break the law.49 This scenario describes how abusive homes push young
women out of the house, cause them to run away, or otherwise become part
of a deviant environment, beginning their law-breaking in “petty hustles or
prostitution” that later turns to drug use and addiction as they live in the
streets, which leads to further lawbreaking to support their habits. Their
disinterest in education, low-paid or unskilled jobs, and pregnancies force
them to turn to either welfare or illegal activity in order to support
themselves. Their lawbreaking is often supported by relationships with
men also involved in crime; they spend their time in the “revolving
criminal justice door” between incarceration and the streets.50 While Daly
46. HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 9-10, 14-18 (2002);
Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to Violent
Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 980 (1998).
47. ZEHR, supra note 46, at 24, 29, 38.
48. See Minow, supra note 46, at 975.
49. See Daly, supra note 4, at 13-14.
50. Id. at 14; Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note 18, at 12, 16 (noting that drug use is
“more likely to initiate females into the underworld and criminal subcultures and to connect
them to drug-dependent males who use them as crime accomplices or exploit them as ‘old
ladies’ to support their addiction”).
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lauds the feminist scenario for taking account of realities that previous
descriptions of women lawbreakers often did not—e.g., their status as
runaways from abusive or strict parents, their use of their bodies as a
primary means of support, and the importance of their children—she argues
that the origins of women’s crime are still not fully accounted for.51
Miller, who studied street women in Milwaukee, corroborates this
theme. Her narratives of the lives of street women in Milwaukee portray a
complexity that make the most complex academic description of street
women seem simplistic and almost dishonest. I describe just one of these
stories in depth because such stories almost strain the credulity of the
typical reader of a law review article who has been brought up in a much
different environment. Sandra, the other woman whose story Miller tells in
depth, begins life as a small-town Norwegian American with working class
parents, and “ends” at twenty-three with a pregnancy and a prison record.
Between the ages of nine and twelve, she tries to “divorce” her parents,
runs away from foster care, is expelled and then sent to a school for
emotionally disturbed children and later a state mental institution (from
which she runs away), and then finally lands in a state institution for
delinquents where she learns forgery, shoplifting, and prostitution.52 In the
next four years, she runs away numerous times from both her family home
and the correctional institution, and then starts “turning tricks,” drinking,
and smoking marijuana at age thirteen. 53 Between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen she gets involved with a check forger, runs away from juvenile
lockup, and works as a prostitute in Milwaukee and Miami. 54 She also
moves in with a heroin user (Al), a pimp who beat one woman prostitute to
death. 55 She moves out, but gets into hard drugs, and then meets up with
Al again at a party and goes back to him “out of loneliness.” 56 She turns
over her life savings of ten thousand dollars to him. 57 From age eighteen to
twenty-three, she works at a topless bar, started an escort service with a
female partner and four other employees, and gets involved with a new
boyfriend who gambles and hustles. 58 She also pimps another woman in
Florida to raise money for attorney’s fees for her boyfriend.59
Additionally, her heavy drug use continues with a subsequent boyfriend,
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Daly, supra note 4, at 14-15.
See MILLER, supra note 10, at 44-45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49-51.
Id. at 50-51.
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which results in her getting arrested for selling drugs to an undercover
agent. 60 She then discovers that she is pregnant, but not by her gambler
boyfriend whom she still hopes to return to when he gets out of prison.61
Within the complexity of Daly’s and Miller’s stories of women criminals
is a steady theme: women’s relationality, as much as anything, accounts for
their status as criminals, as well as the road they take after entering the
criminal system, either re-offending or exiting the system. Eda Tinto
reminds us, critically, that women are not “in a relationship,” as if the
relationship is “separate from the woman and disconnected from her
actions and choices as an individual.” 62 Rather, as Tinto points out, the
relationship itself “influenc[es] and shap[es] the personal choices a woman
makes. The relationship, and the choice to be in a relationship, comprise a
part of the woman’s person.” 63 This reality significantly influences how
women enter the criminal justice system, and why they keep revolving
through its doors.
Daly’s research suggests that women often become criminals because
they fall into intimate relationships with men who are criminals, while
Miller’s research implies that women who may be introduced into crime by
other women accelerate their levels of criminal behavior when they become
attached to men. As intimate partners of men involved in drug activity,
women themselves often become drug abusers. 64 More significantly, in the
most ordinary ways in which they maintain their relationships, some can
become witting or unwitting accomplices in their partners’ drug activities.
Tinto describes how quasi-fictionary legal doctrines extend the tentacles of
the law to embrace women whose chief fault is intimate connection with
drug-abusing criminals: women are arrested for “constructive possession”
of illegal substances because they live with or are in the company of men
who possess drugs. 65 Women engage in what would otherwise be noncriminal activity that is identified as “aiding and abetting,” such as
accompanying a male intimate to a drug sale, answering the phone or the
door in an apartment out of which the intimate sells drugs, or using money
that is the product of a drug sale for household needs for the family. 66
60. Id. at 51.
61. Id. at 52.
62. See Tinto, supra note 25, at 917.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note 18, at 12.
65. See Tinto, supra note 25, at 922.
66. See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and
Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905, 977-79 (1993) (noting the difficulty women have
dissociating themselves from their partners’ crime given its relationship with familial needs
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Miller’s research with “hard-core” women criminals suggests that even
those women who fully understand that they are engaged in criminal
behavior do so at the behest and for the sake of their “man,” the person
who may alternately pimp, protect, woo, beat, and care for them. 67 Indeed,
despite the wide variety of social and economic backgrounds from which
these women come, and the varied reasons they give for hustling, when
these women were asked why they got involved in particularly dangerous
crimes or deviant street behavior, “they were unanimous in saying that it
was because of some ‘man’.” 68 Some women help their boyfriends or
husbands engage in such activities in minor ways, such as delivering
money or drugs. 69 Tinto notes that women are socialized to “stand by
[their] man,” and thus provide assistance both as men commit crime and as
they attempt to avoid being caught for it. 70 Women may also be sent out to
engage in crime by men who perceive that their “marks” are more likely to
fall for a woman. 71 Women may be fronts for men whose previous
contacts with the law have made future criminal activity (and its
accompanying higher punishment) too risky, so they initiate new young
women into increasingly serious crimes. 72
Similarly, as Chris’s case suggests, women may become criminals
because of their failure to act in the face of a husband’s or a lover’s
criminal activity. Particularly in cases involving their children or others for
whom they have legal responsibility, women’s failure to stop male
intimates from physically or sexually abusing others may result in criminal
charges. 73 Moreover, their failure to turn intimates into the police for
criminal behavior they know is occurring may result in charges against
them that police utilize to coerce testimony against those intimates. 74
and activities); Tinto, supra note 25, at 924-25.
67. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 37-38, 40-42.
68. See id. at 162; Steffensmeier & Allen, supra note 18, at 16.
69. See Tinto, supra note 25, at 927.
70. Id. at 932-34.
71. For example, Miller describes the experience of one young woman, whose brother
lured her into check forgery when he saw that she unflinchingly obeyed his request to cash a
bad check. MILLER, supra note 10, at 79-80.
72. Id. at 178.
73. See, e.g., Jeanne A. Fugate, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure-toProtect Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 274, 279 (2001) (noting that caretakers charged with
failure to protect their children are almost exclusively female, whether they are the
children’s mothers or not, because society has higher expectations that they will perform
their “maternal role” in shielding the children from both male intimates and others).
74. See, e.g., Steffensmeier & Allen, supra note 18, at 11 (arguing that women are
arrested more often because law enforcement can then get incriminating evidence against
their associated male offenders, particularly for “male” crimes such as burglary, robbery,
fencing stolen property, and drug dealing).
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Unfortunately, descriptions of women offenders can too easily simplify
the ways in which women are in relationships with male intimates,
portraying them as passive victims or resistant abuse survivors only. Tinto
notes that “women offenders are often victims of crime at the same time
that they choose to commit a crime.” 75 This paradox abstracts a complex
relationship that women who are intimates with male criminals may
experience, a Janus with many faces.
One face of these relationships is psychological, evidencing the work of
psychologists like Gilligan who have made us aware that women fear
separation and isolation, and that part of their security is the preservation of
relationships with others. 76 Sandra returns to a pimp, thief, and killer
because she is lonely. 77 Even women who are proud of their ability to
hustle on the streets without being taken advantage of perceive that these
skills are primarily “something for a woman ‘to fall back on’ when she was
without a man to take care of her.”78 Women may assist offenders in order
to please them and thus protect a loving relationship that they perceive as
necessary to their own survival and meaning as a person, as Chris’s case
suggests.
A second face of such relationships is social: in staying with and
assisting criminal intimates who shelter these women and their children,
women offenders may be attempting to model their relationships according
to the socially desirable expectation of a family with both father and
mother, with father at the head. Miller reports, “[i]t is common for a ‘man’
who wants a woman to work for him to buy presents for her children, to
support them, and to participate to some extent in their care.” 79 Indeed,
men often use the women’s children to renew contact with a woman who
has deserted them for abuse or failure to stand by her.80
A third face of these relationships may be purely pragmatic: lacking
employment skills, women in relationships with criminal males may rightly
perceive that they need the economic and social support of the offending
75. See Tinto, supra note 25, at 920.
76. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT 42-43 (1982); Carol Gilligan, Hearing the Difference: Theorizing
Connection, 10 HYPATIA 120, 124 (1995) [hereinafter Gilligan, Hearing] (noting the
paradox that as women become care ethicists, they silence themselves with others, give up
relationships to have relationships, and then feel stranded in their isolation).
77. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 48.
78. Id. at 166.
79. Id. at 124.
80. Id. For example, men may contact their former lovers to tell them that a child who
is living with the mother’s relative is sick or has had an accident. See Tinto, supra note 25,
at 919 (noting that women may try to keep their families together rather than abandon a
relationship with a criminal father of their children).
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male to survive. Miller suggests that this is particularly true for women
without children, or whose children have been taken from them, because of
the unavailability of all aid but perhaps general assistance. 81 As a result,
she reports, these women “become completely vulnerable to the ‘men’ who
control the streets and/or to their drug habits.” 82
A fourth face of these relationships is similarly survivalist, but at a much
more basic level: women offenders often correctly believe that their choice
to leave the offender or refuse to do his bidding will result in substantial
physical violence, or in the case of addicted offenders, that their choice will
result in being cut off from the supplies that seem their lifeline.83
Similarly, the relationships between women offenders and their children
are more complex than most of these accounts indicate. Different studies
describe several different relational aspects of offender mother-child
relationships. For example, some studies note that women offenders
frequently take out the rage that they have suppressed from their own
childhood experiences on their children, or neglect or abandon their
children as they descend into the hopeless vortex of drugs and crime. 84
Others, as suggested, choose to emphasize the pragmatic choices of
women offenders, whether with or apart from male intimates, who follow
mothering instincts into economic criminal activity to ensure the survival
of their children. 85 Still others describe the high motivation that women
offenders have to get off drugs during pregnancy in order to protect their
fetuses, 86 and others the strong desire of many mothers not to have their
children follow them into crime. 87 Miller, for example, notes the chill one
street hustler experiences when she sees her daughter con relatives into
buying her a forty-seven dollar gold necklace.88 Or they may note the
lower chance of recidivism experienced by women who are allowed to

81. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 123; see also Steffensmeier & Allen, supra note 18, at
16 (noting that “‘doing crime for one’s kids or family’ plays a greater role in female than
male offending,” suggesting that women’s risk-taking is “more protective of relationships
and emotional commitments”).
82. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 123.
83. See Tinto, supra note 25, at 919.
84. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 101, 123; see also ZEHR, supra note 46, at 31-32.
85. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 123; Steffensmeier & Allen, supra note 18, at 11.
86. See Mary E. Roper, Reaching the Babies Through the Mothers: The Effects of
Prosecution on Pregnant Substance Abusers, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 171, 177 (2001)
(noting that drug addicts’ guilt over their abuse is exacerbated during pregnancy, and they
have a strong desire to be drug-free, but have a difficult time breaking their dependency).
87. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 124 (noting, however, that drug dealers will use
children as “fronts” by secreting drugs or stolen items in baby clothes, diaper bags, or
buggies).
88. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 166.
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keep strong relationships with their children, who are their emotional
lifeline. It seems unclear whether women’s motivation not to recidivate
comes because they fear the loss of their children, who are their personal
sources of meaning, or because they are determined to give their children a
better life than the one they are forced into because of their mother’s
incarceration.
Nevertheless, these more obvious ways in which women’s relationality
is critical to their involvement in crime as well as their prospects for
rehabilitation obscure the less obvious. Articles on women’s criminality
recite the highly disproportionate incidence of childhood physical, sexual,
and emotional abuse that is found among female offenders, and the
commonplace experience that they are abandoned by their husbands and
the fathers of their children. 89 The articles note the resulting higher
incidence of mental illness, drug addiction, and unemployment among
female offenders as compared to male offenders.90
Such recitations appear to treat these abusive relationships as ancient
history which has left its deposit of damage on the woman offender’s
psyche that needs therapy, much like a car accident that has crippled a
victim. In fact, women’s complex responses to these experiences of abuse
suggest quite a different reality, as they range from the violent way in
which Latasha lashes out at others, to the passivity Chris shows when she
knows her vulnerable children are being severely abused.
These stories suggest that these women offenders continue to be in an
actual relationship with their abusers or abandoners long after the abuse or
abandonment has occurred, and long after the one who has harmed them
has left the scene, even in cases where they may have seemingly “replaced”
their abusers with other male intimates. Covington explains that most
women offenders are “trauma survivors,” having suffered or witnessed
violence or stigmatization because of their failure to conform to social
expectations of them. 91 Their abuse at the hands of these men is not
ancient history which they have left behind, nor is it damage to be
bandaged. When they are medicating themselves with drugs and alcohol,
they are doing so to escape the daily reality of the confrontation with their
abusers that they re-experience repeatedly. When they lash out at others,
their children, or their victims, they are lashing out at those others as
surrogates for the abusers they wish they could fight back against. They

89. See Covington, supra note 35, at 121-22.
90. See Raeder, supra note 19, at 381; Steffensmeier & Allen, supra note 18, at 16
(noting that women offenders have higher incidences of childhood or adult abuse, and have
more records of biological and psychological abnormalities than men).
91. See Covington, supra note 35, at 126.
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rehearse old events, even if they are now in the role of perpetrators rather
than victims. It is important to recognize that women offenders, not unlike
many other women in distress, maintain their emotional relationships long
after they have no contact in the physical world with those with whom they
continue to be in relationships.
Most contemporary studies of women offenders acknowledge that there
is not one simple description of women offenders—they run the gamut
from calculating, violent aggressions to passive victims. 92 In reality, rarely
do these studies describe women offenders as complex human beings who
continue to be in relationships, and act out of relationship, with the many
others who have influenced their life stories. Nor do these stories fully
suggest how women offenders may be simultaneously motivated by
conflicting sets of emotions and values that cannot be reduced to the
archetypes of a woman as a victim, a woman as a calculating criminal, a
woman as a violent gang girl, or a woman as an irresponsible mother. 93
Any successful correctional model must be built on a relational
understanding of women offenders that accounts for the paradoxical and
complex nature of any particular woman offender’s emotions, perceptions,
and behavior, and is made even more complicated by the specific
experiences of women in specific communities with their own unique
strengths and pathologies. It must make a difference, in any criminal
system purporting to, minimally, prevent recidivism, that American Indian
women offenders have a higher incidence of childhood abuse and alcoholrelated offenses, while Hispanic offenders are often identified by the
system as “ultra-feminine,” and Caucasian female drug offenders are often
ignored.94 It must make a difference that African American poverty-class
women are often introduced to street life because their extended family
networks interlink with deviant street networks. 95
Such a system must also acknowledge by its complexities that women
are simultaneously victims and perpetrators, self-involved and altruistic,
foolish and canny about the effects of their decisions on others, as well as
being simultaneously oblivious to their moral agency and constantly aware

92. See FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 133-44. Flowers claims that women who assist their
spouses in raping others make up the majority of terrorists in the United States, and that
these rape abettors “surpass their counterparts in viciousness and cruelty.” Id. He further
suggests that women gang members are more likely to fight other gang women than the
average person. Id. Moreover, he believes that women con artists are often morally
blameworthy, finding excitement in the “con” game, or carrying out crime in response to an
“abrasive family relationship.”. Id.
93. See Snider, supra note 25, at 367-68.
94. See Ward, supra note 20, at 740, 741, 743.
95. See MILLER, supra note 10, at 74.
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that their actions provoke reactions. At the same time, such a system
cannot promise to provide the resources necessary to ensure full social,
emotional, and economic healing to women in the corrections system.
Even if there were the political will to provide a full panoply of services to
every woman in the corrections system, the prospects that such services
could largely eradicate unhealthy and abusive relationships are daunting.
The question then remains: how should a corrections system that is bound
to produce very imperfect results as it works with someone whose life is as
complex as Sandra’s, understand the relationship of these women
offenders, victims, and the community in these cases?
II. MOVING FROM TRADITIONAL CORRECTIONS THEMES
TO AN ETHICAL APPROACH
Four criminological themes appear to have dominated the discourse over
appropriate corrections responses to women offenders over the past thirty
years. The first, the liberal theme, which seeks formal equality between
men and women in sentencing and/or treatment for similar convictions as a
symbolic gesture of the social equality of men and women in society
generally, seems to be roundly regarded as a failure by those who write
about women’s correctional issues in this century. 96 As previously
suggested, some have placed the failure of these programs at the feet of
formal inequality in the provision of treatment and opportunities provided
to male and female inmates. As suggested earlier, “separate” treatment for
women has only produced “unequal” treatment in terms of the variety and
quality of correctional services offered to women, from job skill and reorientation programs, to counseling and medical services, whether
measured by formal or actual equality standards.97 Second, the actual
inequality which has resulted from treating female prisoners according to a
male model has contributed to a failure of the system to show positive
gains, both in taking in women into corrections systems and in sending
them out successfully. Medical services that do not take into consideration
women’s different medical needs arising from their different biological
makeup, or counseling and social services that do not account for women’s
different roles in their children’s lives, would seem to make failure
certain. 98

96. See FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 162 (noting how inadequate prison conditions call
for reform); Shearer, supra note 36, at 47; see also Wald, supra note 25, at 14–15.
97. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Snider, supra note 25, at 365 (noting the failure of male systems to show
any economic, educational, or social advantage for women, and their preference for benefits
to males and the corrections system).
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Three other themes currently compete for attention in real-life
corrections proposals. I use the term “theme” rather than “model” to
underscore the fact that in most discussions of women’s corrections, these
agendas function like musical themes that predominate in a symphonic
piece rather than closed models that try to explain everything about women
offenders through the model and exclude other explanations. Many who
focus on one of these themes acknowledge the importance of systemic
approaches, and would be quick to acknowledge that in the ideal world, the
full range of concerns expressed by all of these themes should be met by
any successful corrections system. 99 They would, perhaps, argue that
attention to their “theme” brings one closer to the “truth” of offenders’
reality, or it is more likely to score success in preventing recidivism or
returning women offenders to mainstream society, or at least more likely to
be practically successful, given financial and other constraints on
corrections systems
One theme, described by Professor Snider, suggests that power
relationships and gender are mutually constructing and reinforcing in the
corrections system. This theme would explain much about the nature of
corrections failures. Snider cites Bosworth’s study of confined women
inmates who resisted threats to “identity and self-esteem” and
“demoralizing [and] degrading prison-issue concepts of themselves, their
motivation and their offence” by defining themselves “through their
spirituality, sexual orientation, race, class, education or even . . . as a
mother . . . .” 100 Under this theme, then, the key relational dynamic in
corrections is power, and the creation of over-and-under relationships
between the corrections system, the officials within it, and the inmates. 101
The chief goal of any successful corrections system is to encourage and
engender the ability of women to resist any further destruction of women’s
self-concept. 102

99. See Ruth T. Zaplin, Female Offenders: A Systems Perspective, in FEMALE
OFFENDERS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 65 (Ruth T. Zaplin ed.,
1998); see also Susan Baugh et al., Mental Health Issues, Treatment and the Female
Offender, in FEMALE OFFENDERS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS
223 (Ruth T. Zaplin ed., 1998) (arguing that community-based programs that offer
supervision and mental health treatment offer better possibilities for rehabilitation than
incarceration in part because women in community-based programs are able to maintain
their connections with their children).
100. See Snider, supra note 25, at 366.
101. Joyce Dougherty, Female Offenders and Childhood Maltreatment: Understanding
the Connections, in FEMALE OFFENDERS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE
INTERVENTIONS 150-52 (Ruth T. Zaplin, ed., 1998); Snider, supra note 25, at 366
(discussing disciplinary control strategies of even feminist reform movements).
102. See Snider, supra note 25, at 371.
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A second corrections theme might be coined a traditional
psychotherapeutic or medical theme. In this theme, as suggested earlier,
the woman offender is perceived to be suffering from a mental or
emotional disability—post-traumatic stress in the eyes of one author103—
and to be acting criminally out of her illness or disability. That disability is
often described as lack of self-esteem or self-worth, 104 but it may also refer
to the offender’s emotional or physical violence enacted on others or the
self in suicidal attempts, which is considered primarily a mark of the
offender’s illness or disability. 105 Consistent with the medical theme, its
advocates suggest that if appropriate treatment is offered, just as with
treatment of a physical disability, the offender should either be able to
eradicate an emotional or psychological illness, 106 or learn how to live an
effective and full life with an emotional prosthesis just as an amputee can
resume his life with a physical one. For example, Dougherty argues that
creation of healthy relationships with others may require breaking down
emotional barriers of female offenders, exploring their “developmental
environments,” including childhood abuse histories, and then working with
them on recovery from childhood traumas.107
A third theme is built primarily around a skills/services approach.
Pursuing this theme, advocates suggest that the primary problem that
women offenders face is that they are not equipped to live self-sufficient

103. See Baugh et al., supra note 99, at 217-18 (noting Teplin’s study which showed that
one of three female offenders probably suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
resulting in flashbacks, nightmares, and sudden emotions, avoiding close ties, anxiety, and
other symptoms); Covington, supra note 35, at 113.
104. See, e.g., Bernard Weitzman, The Treatment of Female Offenders: Individual
Psychotherapy in Systems-Theory Perspective, in FEMALE OFFENDERS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 171-77 (Ruth T. Zaplin ed., 1998) (arguing
that working with a woman’s negative self-regard is the most important contribution that
psychotherapy can make to the treatment of women offenders).
105. See Dougherty, supra note 101, at 240-41 (discussing women criminals’
normalization of childhood maltreatment).
106. For examples of the use of therapeutic models of criminal behavior, see id. at 23637, 242 (discussing the need for women criminals to break down their emotional walls and
give up their maladaptive behaviors such as interpersonal violence); see also Conrad G.
Brunk, Restorative Justice and the Philosophical Theories of Criminal Punishment, in THE
SPIRITUAL ROOTS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 42 (Michael L. Hadley ed., 2001) (arguing that
in the “therapeutic state,” crime is “a deviant behavior stemming from an illness suffered by
the offender [patient or victim or both], the offender’s family, or the offender’s society,” for
which the offender/patient is not responsible.). But see Weitzman, supra note 104, at 16667 (challenging the traditional psychotherapy paradigm as applicable for women criminals).
Snider, supra note 25, at 364 (noting the “pathologizing, individualizing, and
disempowering” effects of the “offender-as-victim” paradigm).
107. See Covington, supra note 35, at 126-28; Dougherty, supra note 101, at 242.
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lives in the real world without resorting to crime. 108 Advocates suggest
that women offenders cannot fit within the economic, social, and political
structures that law-abiding citizens can because of deficits in their skills
and circumstances. 109 Women offenders do not have the education or skills
to achieve gainful employment, and as a result, some who focus on a
skills/service approach concentrate on providing education and
employment services, though in many programs it is difficult to get beyond
traditional women’s vocations. 110 Similarly, any dysfunction in women
offenders’ relationships with their children may be deemed a skills deficit,
which parenting classes and mentoring can significantly alleviate, if not
completely resolve. 111 Even psychologically related problems, such as
substance abuse which is essentially self-medication of women’s traumatic
response to earlier abuse, are treated somewhat technically: unlike the
psychotherapy theme, which seeks to overcome the psychological trauma
like an illness, the skills/services theme attempts to equip women with the
skills they need to cope with self-esteem and other psychological issues, so
that they can function competently in non-criminal society.
In all three of these themes, the woman functions as a subject, but only
at best as a resisting subject. In the power/resistance model, the discourse
is focused on a woman’s identity as a creature responding to the impersonal
forces of correctional control around her. In that sense, she is the object of
other forces, the harsh impersonality of the corrections system that has her
in its power, or even the direct abusive actions of those who wield power to
rape, physically abuse, demean, or diminish her. To the extent she is a
subject, she is only a respondent—she retains an identity not by acting as
an agent, but by resisting the actions of the agent/system or agent/officer

108. See, e.g., Zaplin, supra note 99, at 67-68; Zaplin & Dougherty, Programs that Work:
Working with Prostitutes, in FEMALE OFFENDERS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE
INTERVENTIONS 340-44 (Ruth T. Zaplin, ed., 1998) (describing parenting, emotional
management, and basic life skills needed for offenders to become “self-reliant and selfsupporting individuals”). Raeder, supra note 66, at 910-13 (discussing the increase in
female crime due to economic marginalization); see also Steffensmeier & Allan, supra note
18, at 10-11, 44 (discussing how patriarchy pushes women into crimes through
victimization, role entrapment, economic marginalization and vulnerability).
109. See Zaplin, supra note 99, at 68.
110. See FLOWERS, supra note 18, at 157 (noting that virtually all of women’s vocational
training programs are in traditional women’s positions such as sewing, clerical skills, food
services, and cosmetology).
111. For an example of a rehabilitative model that focuses on the lack of skills of
offenders, see Zaplin & Dougherty, supra note 108, at 336-37, 340-44 (describing courtmandated reunification services that include parent education, planned contact, and other
obligations, and a three-phase program focused on parenting classes, parent support groups,
and work with offenders in “emotional management, identifying individual deficits, and
learning stress management strategies”).
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through identity-preserving strategies.
In arguments stressing the psychotherapeutic theme, the focus of the
corrections system can largely focus on reorganizing and re-fitting the
disarrayed internal workings of the offender’s mind. By rehearsing and
naming her abuse before a trained professional, and by attempting to
release the grip that an abuser continues to hold upon her, the offender is
again a subject, but the focus of the psychological model is almost
exclusively upon her own subjectivity. 112 Or, to the extent that focus is
interpersonal, the women offender is a reacting subject, who is seeking to
assert herself in resistance against those who have made her a victim.
Where in the previous model she was a survivor of abusive power, here she
is a survivor of disability. And, once more, the goal is to make her a
subject whose actions in seeking a cure are focused upon, and will largely
benefit herself, her own well-being, her own peace of mind, and her own
autonomy, albeit with important side effects for her children and others
with whom she will have relationships in the future.
For advocates stressing the services theme, the offender is a subject reformulating her self-concept and her abilities in a way that will enlarge her
horizon of opportunities when she leaves the correctional system. As a
subject, the offender is expanding her capabilities in a way that makes her
more flexible and powerful as a subject acting upon the outside world. She
is adding to the skills, expertise, and competencies she has to integrate
herself into the social, political, and economic institutions which formerly
had no place for her, and left her to survive through dependence upon a
male intimate.
Many arguments for correctional reform, of course, do not only focus
upon women offenders’ needs. They also account for the needs of the
children those offenders leave behind. Thus, for example, recent model
corrections programs have provided cottage-like correctional facilities that
enable mothers to live with their children during periods of confinement, or
advocate more home confinement and community corrections options for
women who are mothers. 113 Yet, beyond touting the positive effects of the
interaction of women and children on each other, these models do not fully
flesh out what it means for women offenders to be conceived of as agents
and not just subjects.

112. But see Weitzman, supra note 104, at 166-67 (arguing that systems theory
practitioners who have criticized traditional therapies for focusing on the causal structure of
individuals’ mental life instead of the dysfunctional patterns that individuals in the system
co-create, do not give enough credit to individually oriented psychotherapists for noticing
systemic concerns).
113. See Raeder, supra note 19, at 378-79 (noting the lack of funds for such programs).
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I would suggest that a corrections policy that predominantly understood
the corrections process as a system of ethical interaction would better
capture the complexity of many women offenders’ experience as primarily
relational human beings, and has the best hope of helping women not only
to understand, but to act out their moral agency. I believe that restorative
justice has the best chance, of the currently available corrections responses,
to reflect an ethical perspective in its response to offenders.
III. MOVING TO WOMEN AS AGENTS: THE ETHICS OF CARE
AND WOMEN’S RESPONSIBILITY
It is not surprising that, in systems which have a great stake in
demonstrating success in changing lives, the complexity of human
experience and human interactions is likely to be simplified or elided. As
in any experiment, if too many variables exist, it is difficult to show how an
impact on one of them causes a real change in result. Nonetheless,
focusing on the need for provable and replicable results in corrections is
likely neither to produce replicable results, nor to portray a real social
picture of how women experience their world in relation to the others with
whom they have interacted and continue to interact.
Moreover, to promise results that are not realistically obtainable because
of average human limitations and the incorrigibility of human evil can
result in a public attitude of defeat about the system. Indeed, the almost
complete rejection of the rehabilitation model among “average folks”
would appear to stem more from reformers’ rosy and overzealous
promising of results to the public than from any evidence that it is less
effective than retributive systems at making safer communities.114 Public
resignation to the belief that no utilitarian corrections approaches are viable
will inevitably rebound to focus exclusively on retributive or incapacitation
theories, which do not require any evidence of “outputs.” 115 Such a
reaction to the failure of over-promising systems is not only costly in terms
of the more frequent and lengthier sentences that must be meted out to

114. See Frank B. W. Hawkinshire, Social Treatment: A Multiphased Event, in FEMALE
OFFENDERS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 83, 86, 89 (Ruth T.
Zaplin, ed., 1998) (noting that neither side in the rehabilitation controversy has proven its
case).
115. Retribution focuses on just punishment for past behavior, not prediction of what the
offender will do in the future. See, e.g., ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS:
CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 8, 10 (1975). Incapacitation certainly
protects society from possible future crimes, but it is not based on some prediction about
who is in fact likely to commit a crime. See id. at 51-52 (noting that since most criminals do
not commit crimes in prison, incapacitation prevents the commission of crimes but that
many incarcerated people are not likely to re-offend).
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restore a just balance between victim and offender or to ensure (again, in a
foolproof way) that no likely offenders are on the streets, resulting in more
cries for new prison beds and corrections staff. It is also costly in terms of
lost social and economic opportunities for those who will not recidivate but
are over-incarcerated because they cannot be distinguished from likely
recidivists. 116
Indeed, as shocking as it may seem to pure retributivists, overincarceration is costly even in the case of those who commit minor crimes,
the cost of which is outweighed by the benefits of their remaining free.117
For example, only those who are purists on the symbolic weight that
unpunished crime visits upon the community could fail to appreciate that it
might make more sense not to incarcerate a working mother, who supports
her children by occasionally underestimating her employment income to
her caseworker (the crime of welfare fraud). If viewed only from an
economic perspective, the amount of money the government “loses” by not
offsetting her extra employment income against her welfare check would
be vastly outweighed by the cost of incarcerating her and putting her
children into the foster care system. 118 And, such a simplistic cost-benefit
analysis would not take into account the intangible benefits her children
and family members gain by her care and support for them. 119
There is a way out of this dilemma that avoids the false promises of
utilitarian theories, while offering ways in which the corrections system can
respond to the realities of offenders’ lives, instantiating social values about
criminal activity. That is to begin to treat the woman offender in the
116. See, e.g., John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among
Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 40
(1998) (noting that prison is likely to lower future productivity and increase psychological
stress for prisoners and their families); John Hagan & Ronitz Dinovitzer, Collateral
Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST.
146 (1999) (describing the numerous social and psychological costs of imprisonment on
families).
117. For example, it would be cheaper for the state to repay a bank that lost $10,000 to an
employee-embezzler, than to spend the money to incarcerate the embezzler for a year. See
infra note 118.
118. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 116, at 4-6 (suggesting that the cost of
incarceration is about $36,000 per inmate plus $19,554 to provide welfare, food stamps, and
medical benefits to her child). While that cost that might still be incurred by society if the
custodial parent was not in prison, but on public assistance, if the parent is economically
self-sufficient before prison, the cost of imprisonment of a mother with one child would rise
to over $55,000 on these calculations. Id.
119. See Raeder, supra note 19, at 378-79. Raeder describes a demonstration project that
housed offenders and their children under seven in residential facilities outside a prison
which permitted a stable environment for the children. Id. Non-abusive, non-violent
offenders facing prison terms under seven years who were primary caretakers were eligible.
Id.
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literature not simply as either an object of corrections programs or as only a
subject to be empowered, or as a person to be made healthy or skilled. It is,
instead, to treat women offenders as moral agents, who are in responsive
relationships to others, both past and present. In fact, I expect that many
“line” corrections professionals who work with women do treat them as
agents, rather than objects or subjects. But, the systemic obsession for
provable results bears the risk not only of clouding their perspective about
what their relationship to their clients’ agency means, but can also leave
them with a persistent and unwarranted sense of failure because the results
promised by the three other themes, and demanded by politicians and the
public, have not been fully obtained.
To treat a woman offender as an agent is to treat her as someone who is
accountable for her actions upon others, as well as a person who is shaped
by action of others upon her, actions both past and present, actions both
verbal and physical. As I have suggested, it is to treat her through the
rubric of ethics rather than psychology, medicine, or as a cog that needs to
be fit into a social system. To use theologian H. Richard Niebuhr’s
language, it is to treat the woman offender as a responsible self.120 Niebuhr
argued that being a responsible self has four dimensions: first, the agent
proposes to respond to action upon herself; second, she interprets the action
upon her prior to responding or the question she is expected to answer;
asking, “What is going on? What is being done to me? What is my end?
or What is my ultimate law?” 121 Third, the agent is accountable, or in
Niebuhr’s words, she expects that someone else will answer her answers, or
evaluate her response. 122 Niebuhr argues that an agent’s action is like a
statement in a dialogue. Such a statement not only seeks to meet, as it
were, or fit into, the previous statement to which it is an answer, but is
made in anticipation of reply. It looks forward as well as backward; it
anticipates objections, confirmations, and corrections. It is made as part of
a total conversation that leads forward and is to have meaning as a
whole. 123 That conversation may be action or it may be words, but the
dynamic is the same. Finally, Niebuhr argues that our action is
“responsible” when it “is response to action upon us in a continuing
discourse or interaction among beings forming a continuing society,”124
and when it recognizes both continuity in the self and continuity in the

120. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF: AN ESSAY
PHILOSOPHY 6-7 (1963).
121. Id. at 63.
122. Id. at 64.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 65.
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community of other agents to which the individual is responding.
This dialogical way of understanding human agency may not
immediately seem relevant to the systemic problems of dealing with an
average woman offender. Carol Gilligan, and others who have posed a
“different voice” in which women imagine their lives, suggest how a
woman’s strong sense of relationality can be both a positive and limiting
force in her ability to confront critical ethical issues like deciding whether
to commit a crime. 125
The usual caveat applies, of course: we must be mindful of the danger of
“essentializing” this “different voice”—e.g., by suggesting that women
function with an ethics of care and men function with an ethics of rights, a
claim which has proven both incorrect and potentially perverse.126 Later
studies have shown a decided skew among women toward a care ethics
approach, and among men toward a rights ethics approach, but large
numbers of men and women do not operate according to their own gender’s
typing, and even switch approaches depending on the problem they are
presented with. 127 But that reality speaks more to the need for corrections
systems to understand how individual offenders think about moral
problems than to ignore the “different voice” of many women offenders in
the system. If we speak as if “women do X” and “men believe Y,” we may
include women who do not operate from this perspective in a system that is
unresponsive to their ethical analysis, and may exclude men who are
primarily “care ethicists.” However, there are also dangers in ignoring
such differences altogether because of the fear of essentialism. To
construct a corrections system based on the assumptions of an “ethics of
rights” would similarly be to ignore the reality of many women offenders’
lives in a way that might make corrections programs futile where they are
concerned. 128 The reader will, perhaps, thus forgive my use of the general
language of “women” and “women offenders,” if she can keep in mind that
per these criticisms, I am referring to some significant subset of the larger
class of women offenders.

125. See Gilligan, Hearing, supra note 76, at 120; William C. Spohn, Conscience and
Moral Development, 6 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 122,128-29 (2000).
126. See Gilligan, Hearing, supra note 76, at 2-3 (noting that such an ethic is not
essentially associated with women but that women are ones who voice these realities);
Spohn, supra note 125, at 128-29 (arguing that justice and care do not exhaust the moral
considerations that most people utilize, and noting that social setting and relationship may
affect “care ethics”).
127. See Gilligan, Hearing, supra note 76, at 6.
128. See Naomi R. Cahn, Speaking Differences: The Rules and Relationships of
Litigants’ Discourses, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1705, 1716 (1992) (suggesting that litigants’ use of
a relational style disadvantages them in a rule-oriented legal culture).
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A woman’s instinct of caring for others in relationships certainly is
positive in many respects. It is critical in maintaining social bonds that
permit family units and other human relations that are so necessary for
human life to continue. Indeed, to the extent that crime is about human
relationships gone astray in some profound way, in which—at least in
many crimes—one person deeply injures another in ways that have lifelong
reverberations, women’s unthinking relationality may pose a real
opportunity. Some studies have suggested that men committing some of
the most serious offenses, such as rape, simply “have no clue” about the
nature of the harm they inflict on victims. 129 If Gilligan and others are
right, that should not be a surprise. A “rights ethicist” matures through
separation and individuation, resulting in a “search for autonomy, the wish
to gain control over the sources and objects of pleasure, in order to shore up
the possibilities for happiness against the risk of disappointment and
loss.” 130 The rights ethicist thus begins with “his responsibility to himself,
a responsibility that he takes for granted, [and] then considers the extent to
which he is responsible to others as well . . . recognizing that ‘you have to
live with other people’” which requires him to seek “rules to limit
interference and thus to minimize hurt.”131
An unmatured rights ethicist whose concrete imagination of the world
begins and almost ends with himself—that is, a person who operates on the
world from the perspective of his own needs and desires and has little
natural empathetic connection to the needs of others—would not be
expected to fully grasp, except perhaps in the abstract way, how profoundly
he violates another when he sexually harasses, assaults, or rapes her, for
example. It should not be a big surprise when a concrete desire to subdue
or overpower or take from another prevails over an abstract recognition that
such behavior is morally wrong. By contrast, a “care ethicist” who is
instinctively tuned to others’ feelings and actions as much as, or even more
than, her own, is part of the way to recognizing the nature of the harm she
has caused another in crime.
Yet, a care ethics “psychology” also has its limitations, and never so
much as when care ethicists are in early stages of moral development.
Gilligan’s original description of the three stages of women’s moral

129. See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs
of Forced Sex, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 845, 866, 888 (2002); see also Brandi Stellings, The
Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination and Citizenship, 28 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 185, 205 (1993) (describing Ellen Scarry’s argument that women’s
experience of rape is unimaginable to men).
130. See Gilligan, supra note 76, at 8, 46.
131. Id. at 37.
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decision-making on a similar issue—the question whether to have an
abortion—fits the self-reports of the women offenders in Miller’s book.
Following Kohlberg, Gilligan notes that in a child’s pre-conventional
morality, “judgment is egocentric and derives moral constructs from
individual needs,” with an “initial focus on caring for the self in order to
ensure survival.” 132 In these earliest moral stages, “the self, which is the
sole object of concern, is constrained by a lack of power that stems from
feeling disconnected and thus, in effect, all alone. The wish ‘to do a lot of
things’ is constantly belied by the limitations of what has in fact been
done.” 133 Morality is simply a matter of sanctions imposed by society. 134
More mature womens’ conventional judgment constructs moral
problems as problems “of care and responsibility in relationships . . .
relationships . . . of obligation to exercise care and avoid hurt. The
inflicting of hurt is considered selfish and immoral in its reflection of
unconcern, while the expression of care is seen as the fulfillment of moral
responsibility.” 135 “[The fusion of this concept] with a maternal morality
that seeks to ensure care for the dependent and unequal characterizes the
second perspective.” 136 But in the conventional stage, a woman’s conflict
between altruism and the needs of the self can result in her seeking to avoid
responsibility for choices she has made, isolating herself to avoid hurt, or
working on the pretense that she is not an agent.137
Miller’s street women, many of whom are just moving into physical
adulthood, describe their relationships with the men and children in their
lives in a way that hovers between pre-conventional and conventional
morality of the “care ethics” type. On one hand, when street women ask
why they hustle, they report that they do it for the excitement or the money,
suggesting a focus on their own immediate needs. Many suggest that they
continue in the relationships they have, or continue in their life of crime in
order to meet their survival needs.138 Like pre-conventional moralists,
street women cut themselves off from others to avoid hurt: they distrust
women even more than the individual men who inhabit their lives,
imagining them as “jealous, gossipy troublemakers” who are natural
enemies in the conflict over men, who utilize these conflicts to control

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 81-82.
See Tinto, supra note 11 at 919 n.59.
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women. 139
Still others mimic the pre-conventional pattern of failure to take
responsibility, noting that they were involved in crime because of a man, or
because they are “innately evil, controlled by something beyond
themselves.” 140 As Georgia says, “A person’d have to be possessed [to do
what I have done.] Deep down inside I believe I have a problem. I’m
beyond the point where anybody can reach me. I’m a money fanatic.”141
While acknowledging that their crime in principle merited punishment,
such women were also quick to object to inequities in the criminal justice
system, including its failure to overlook their crimes in some
circumstances. 142 Anita says,
There’s people out there that hurt children . . . that get teenagers hooked
on drugs and shit. They’re out there on the streets. And they take me [for
armed robbery.] I made one mistake, now, since I been grown, all of
them other things was from the time I was fifteen up to seventeen . . . this
here is the only case I done since I been grown, and they took my freedom
away from me . . . . Why me? 143

Some of these women suggested that the moral imbalance in the system
meant that they were “owed” some illegal acts without punishment.” 144
On the other hand, in both words and actions, street women suggest that
their needs for attachment, and their focus on the needs and desires of their
“man” and their children, play heavily in their moral decision-making
processes. Most women aspire to raise their children in comfort and away
from the street with a man who will “be faithful to them and care for
them.” 145 They do not involve their children in their work, except as
unwitting “fronts,” and often cite their children’s needs as a motivation to
hustle over straight work that does not sustain their families. 146 And, as
suggested, most are clear that they do not want their children assuming
street life. 147 Yet, Miller notes the “catch 22” that makes it difficult for
women to stop criminal behavior: “[o]n the one hand, children are a moral

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

MILLER, supra note 10, at 160.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 124.
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force militating against involvement in street life, while, on the other, they
are responsibilities that promote it and sometimes physical links to ‘men’
involved in it.” 148 The sort of efforts women will go to on behalf of their
“man” are illustrated over and over again in Miller’s narratives. Indeed,
street women often link up with a lover, agree to prostitution to support
him, and then accede to his wishes to take another woman to work for him
and share his bed, becoming his “bottom woman” who can spend more
time at home and less on the streets.149
Gilligan’s book, A Different Voice, and subsequent work suggest two
important ways in which women’s relationality can prevent a woman from
becoming a responsible self in the Niebuhrian sense. We might call them
the “circle of care” problem and the “moral agency” problem.
First, because many women’s relations with others are concrete and
historically shaped as opposed to abstractly deduced from principles,150
women’s ethical perspectives will similarly be shaped by the concrete
relationships in which they are enmeshed. To cut to the chase, it should not
be a surprise that women offenders are often caught assisting their male
intimates in crime, whether that assistance is comprised of quotidian
“household maintenance” activities such as answering the door at the
couple’s drug house, or more sinister activities such as planning and
participating in a robbery. If ethics follows existence, then it stands to
reason that women will make choices as moral agents that reflect their
intimate ties. That is, they will understand their direct and primary moral
responsibilities to be in maintaining and supporting the familial bonds that
they experience as meaningful and morally demanding. It should not be a
surprise that a mother refuses to give up her son to the cops, or that a wife
assists her husband in a drug deal. From the perspective of the concrete
moral system in which she lives, such a woman is likely to perceive the
abstract demands of society telling her that drugs are no good for the
community as a whole to be unconvincing against the very concrete
demands of her family for a secure existence. One way we might describe
this is to say that these women’s “circles of care” are too small.
Similarly, it should not be surprising if women “partners in crime” are
found more among the least educated and affluent members of society,
even excluding economic explanations for crime. Middle and upper-class
women are more often exposed—particularly through higher education, but
also through employment, civic responsibilities, and other community

148. Id. at 126.
149. Id. at 41.
150. See Gilligan, supra note 76,at 26-32.
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activities—to a larger variety of interpersonal experiences beyond those of
their own family and neighborhood, making it more possible for them to
imagine how they are in relation not only to those with whom they live
every day, but those others who constitute a wider community. Just to take
higher education as an example, through a novel or play or film, a woman
can experience and empathize with another human being whose lifeexperience is very different from her own, and thus enter into a relation that
she did not have. Through the study of history, a woman can be exposed to
countless others who have suffered or thrived because of the moral
response of individuals just like her.
A second problem that Gilligan identifies in her classic work is that
women who operate from a care approach can deny their moral agency.
This denial of agency is quite the converse of male “rights ethicists” who
tend to maximize their agency by framing the responses of others from
within the framework of their own needs and desires, thereby minimizing
the effects of their actions on others because they cannot really imagine,
except in an analogizing, abstract way, those same needs and desires in
others. In her study of women who are trying to make abortion decisions,
Gilligan demonstrates how women who run into conflict between the needs
of their unborn children and their own (or those of other loved ones) often
resolve that tension by the pretense that they are not making moral
decisions with human consequences. 151
This play results from several aspects of the way in which women who
function from a care ethics perspective see the world. First, after they have
passed the initial “selfish” level of moral development, women at the level
of “care” do not identify their own needs as being important.152 Second,
they tend not to acknowledge possible conflicts with the ways in which
others might perceive the moral situation. They assume that their
empathetic relationship with others and any judgments they may be
intuitively making about what best meets others’ needs are shared by those
upon whom they act, without considering the possibility that the actedupon might have quite different ideas about these needs. 153 Third, such
women do not easily acknowledge the possibility that there might be an
actual conflict in the responsibilities that they owe all of the parties affected
by their actions; to acknowledge such a possibility is to acknowledge the
fact that they must harm someone, and that they cannot care for

151. Id. at 81.
152. Id. at 74 (describing the “disequilibrium” that results from the exclusion of a
woman’s self in her moral decision-making).
153. Id. at 8
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everyone. 154 Finally, because such women are responding to the perceived
needs of others, they may not have a good sense that they are active
subjects; i.e., that their actions cannot only fill “holes” in the lives of
others’ need, but also can change the relationship or situation to a new one.
In this situation of necessarily conflicting interests, Gilligan argues,
“[a]lthough the feminine identification of goodness with self-sacrifice
clearly dictates the ‘right’ resolution of this dilemma, the stakes may be
high for the woman herself, and in any event the sacrifice of the fetus
compromises the altruism of an abortion motivated by concern for
others.” 155 Because such a premium is placed, in this moral system, on
women’s putting their own needs and desires last, if recognizing them at
all, women who follow the instinct to preserve their own interests by
sacrificing the fetus create the psychological subterfuge that they are not
acting, or that they are not harming anyone when they act.156
Gilligan proposed that many women move to higher stages of moral
development from this position. In the next stage, they come to
acknowledge the reality that they are making choices that will affect others,
and that they are responsible for the choices they make—“a shift in concern
from goodness to truth,” as women assess the morality of an action “not on
the basis of its appearance in the eyes of others, but in terms of the realities
of its intention and consequence.” 157 A second transition occurs when the
care ethicist re-conceives the notion of goodness to “encompass the needs
of both self and others, to be responsible to others and thus to be ‘good’ but
also to be responsible to herself and thus to be ‘honest’ and ‘real.’” 158 By
“elevating nonviolence to a principle . . . she is able to assert a moral
equality between self and other and to include both in the compass of care.
Care then becomes a universal injunction, a self-chosen ethics . . . .” 159
But, not all women who make moral decisions out of a “care”
perspective make these two transitions. Women offenders, especially those
whose psychological or economic preservation lies in their ties to their
male intimates who are also strong-willed offenders, may have strong
incentives to deny that they are morally responsible agents. It may be
psychologically and morally less discordant for them to admit that there is
a conflict between the needs of their man or family and the needs of the
wider society. This is apparent especially when they commit crimes that

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 80.
Id.
See id. at 84, 86.
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 90.
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sometimes have no visible human victims, such as drug crimes,
embezzlement, welfare fraud, and other property crimes. It may be more
palatable for them to block out all harm to themselves and their loved ones
in their focus on possible harm to their male intimate, and to frame threats
to the family in terms of the male offender’s failure to achieve his criminal
goals and to avoid detection. Thus, assistive behavior that satisfies the
male offender’s desires or protects him from being arrested may seem to
satisfy women’s needs both to protect their loved ones and to protect
themselves. For such women to admit that there might be a divergence in
interests between their children and their male intimate, or between
themselves and the male offender in the family, would require them to
admit that they will need to harm someone whose needs are more important
to them than their own.
IV. THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE RESPONSE WITHIN AN
ETHICS OF CARE
Restorative justice approaches would appear to be more promising in
responding to the “circles of care” and “moral agency” problems that
offender women who respond out of an ethic of care may pose. Restorative
justice, in contrast to retributive justice, is fundamentally relational. One of
its most fundamental principles is that “[c]rime is a violation of people and
of interpersonal relationships.” 160 Like women operating with an ethics of
care, restorative justice not only recognizes but also assumes that human
beings are interconnected, that relationships are central, and that crime is “a
tear in the web of relationships.” 161 Restorative justice, then, starts where
such women start: with the concrete, with human interaction; indeed,
interaction not only of those physically present at the “scene of a crime,”
but those who are present because the victim and offender are living their
lives out of a continuing relationship with them and those in the community
who are indirectly affected by the crime. Thus, family members who have
made a victim more vulnerable to damage by the emotional impact of
crime, previous abusers of either victim or offender, and those who
exercise moral influence on the offender such as parents and elders may be
involved in many restorative justice processes such as sentencing circles
and family group conferencing. 162

160. ZEHR, supra note 46, at 19.
161. Id. at 19-20.
162. Sentencing circles are one form of restorative justice practice that involve offenders,
victims, and members of the community, including immediate neighbors, family members,
police officers, and even judges in a round-robin discussion of the harms imposed by the
offender. These discussions seek to get the offender to acknowledge his or her remorse and
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Restorative processes also speak to the concreteness of care ethicists’
relational imagination about their responsibility. They require a woman
offender to sit in a circle with those whom she has harmed, emotionally as
well as economically. This enables the woman offender to hear the full
complexity of the harm she caused through narrative, and to experience the
emotions that both individual and community as victims experience as a
result of that crime. 163 A woman offender who is surrounded by people
whom she has actually harmed, may, through restorative encounters,
become more capable of expanding her circle of care to include concrete
others who have been harmed by her actions, including members of the
community who cease being impersonal. A drug offender can start to
empathize with the distraught daughter of an addict who cannot care for her
because of the drugs, or a mother who is scared because her kids are drug
couriers, or a police officer who despairs at the waste of life he sees every
day. An embezzler can expand her circle of care from her own family, to
the bank accountant who has to clean up the mess left by her crime, or the
bank customers who are frightened by the insecurity of their accounts.
Restorative processes urge offenders to care about the needs of others, as
they have been taught to care for their most immediate circle, rather than to
turn away from caring.
None of these opportunities are offered by traditional retributive
practices because, with the exception of the actual individual victims, few
of the people whom a woman offender has affected actually appear in pretrial, trial or post-trial procedures. A person who becomes addicted
because of the offender’s behavior and the mother whose children are
involved with dealing are not likely to be called to the stand to give
evidence. Even for those victims who appear, the rules of evidence and the
traditional manner of presentation of witness testimony discourage the
expression of pain, fear, and other emotions experienced by victims.
Indeed, the retributive system discourages any relational bonding between
the offender and the victim, portraying crime as an offense against the
state 164 and the victim as a mere tool facilitating prosecution or a bystander
to set an appropriate reparation for the victim, and to initiate a discussion about what the
offender needs to avoid re-offending. See Arthur W. Blue & Meredith A. Rogers Blue, The
Case for Aboriginal Justice and Healing the Self Perceived Through a Broken Mirror, in
THE SPIRITUAL ROOTS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 76-77(Michael A. Hadley ed., 2001); ZEHR,
supra note 46, at 50-51. Family group conferencing is a method of dealing with neglected,
abused or delinquent children which brings all members of the extended family together
with professionals to determine how the child’s best interests will be served. Id. at 47-49.
163. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, Domestic Violence and Restorative Justice:
Answering Key Questions, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 263, 270-271 (2000) (describing the
process of having the offender listen to the victim).
164. See also ZEHR, supra note 46, at 16 (noting that the criminal process discourages
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awaiting satisfaction.
Second, restorative processes identify women offenders as persons
worthy of a response, as persons to whom the community needs to be
responsible. Many women offenders live lives as both victims and
offenders. 165 Traditional retributive systems downplay, and indeed in some
cases erase, the ways in which women offenders have been victimized by
both their male intimates and others in their past, at least until sentencing.
It is not considered relevant to the woman’s culpability until that
victimization is manifested in extreme ways, such as in the defenses of
duress and insanity. And, with the success of determinate sentencing, little
of a woman’s (or man’s) experience as a victim is taken into consideration
even at that stage. 166
By contrast, restorative processes begin with the understanding that
healing in the community cannot occur, even the victim’s healing, until the
offender “comes clean” about why she committed such an offense and
takes responsibility for it. 167 Such a process requires the offender to tell the
story of her background as both an offender and possibly as a victim of
others’ abuse and neglect. The restorative focus on “equal concern and
commitment” to the offender as a person worthy of community regard and
the offering of community support 168 has the potential of enabling care
ethicists who are “stuck” at the conventional stage to re-conceive their
relationships with others. First, as the community begins to regard the
offender as someone who is worthy of concern in a complex calculus of
differing interests, the offender herself may come to see that she is
someone who needs to be included in the “circle of caring,” enabling her to
transition to Gilligan’s third stage of truth-telling and a redefinition of the
good to include herself. 169
Second, for those whose actions are driven largely by others’ judgments
of them, rather than their own sense of themselves, restorative processes
may reflect back to women offender’s aspects of their character that they

offenders from understanding or empathizing with their victims, and encourages them to
look out for themselves).
165. See ZEHR, supra note 46, at 30-31.
166. See, e.g., Tinto, supra note 25, at 921, 936-37, 939-40 (discussing the mandatory
drug sentencing laws’ refusal to look at women’s relationships and culpability in
sentencing).
167. See Luna, supra note 25, at 233, 293-94.
168. See ZEHR, supra note 46, at 40; Luna, supra note 25, at 233 (noting that the
restorative justice system operates according to the presumption that offenders should be
restored to their communities by their acceptance of responsibility and community
reintegration).
169. See Gilligan, supra note 76, at 90.
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have not seen in themselves. This includes capacities such as concern for
others, strength in difficult circumstances, and the ability to make
independent decisions. This “reflected light” may make it possible for
women offenders to begin to see a difference between the needs and desire
of their male intimates and the needs and interests of themselves and their
children in a way that was not immediately apparent to them before, as they
were making instinctive choices to assist their male intimates to achieve
these intimates’ goals.
Moreover, to the extent that care ethicists tend to confuse their own
perceptions of the situation with those in their circle of care, the
confrontative processes of restorative justice may allow women to be
challenged about their perceptions of the situation. If they are forced to
confront their victims and family members, those victims and family
members will challenge care ethicists’ predisposition to “fuse” their own
perceptions with those of their victims, assuming that their victims
experience their wrongdoing as the offenders do.
Perhaps most importantly, restorative justice processes also respond to
the second problem Gilligan highlights: they take seriously the idea that
offenders are moral agents, even when they are also victims. Restorative
justice advocates have noted how the traditional justice system reinforces
perpetrators’ natural instincts, sometimes based on their own past abusive
experience, that they are the real victims and that their victims’ harms are
somehow illusory. 170 Moreover, in many cases, women offenders are
indeed victims and legitimately see themselves as such. By contrast,
retributive systems put the state against the individual offender. Therefore,
the offender may be encouraged to continue in their denial of the fact that
they have harmed anybody by their crime, and to project denial out onto
the victim or others in the system.
In Niebuhr’s terms, restorative processes mimic the dialogical
imagination of responsible persons. Offenders who are seriously open to
participating in the process can begin to understand that they are acted
upon by others. The process can allow offender women to identify the
ways in which they are in relationship with those ghosts of their past, with
whom they continue in a relationship, sometimes by making them a part of
the problem and a part of the solution, as in family conferencing. 171 If such

170. Id. at 16 (noting that the retributive system encourages defendants to rationalize
their behavior).
171. Shearer notes that family interventions with women who have substance abuse
problems resulting from childhood traumas can be successful even when the whole family
does not participate. Shearer, supra note 42, at 47; see also C. Quince Hopkins et al.,
Applying Restorative Justice to Ongoing Intimate Violence: Problems and Possibilities, 23

FAILINGER_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:12 PM

LESSONS UNLEARNED

135

processes are conducted with sensitivity toward the offender’s possible
victimization, they can help the victim finally attend to the stages of
victimhood that give rise to her “need” to take out her aggression against
another—the stages of shock, denial, panic at the realization of what she
has lost, suppression of her grief and fear, anger at the perpetrator, and
desire for justice. 172 It may permit the offender to express her feelings of
rage about those in her life who have harmed her in an egalitarian setting
that requires her also to acknowledge how she has perpetuated that abuse
by her crime, and thus discourages its repetition in the future.
Second, restorative processes push women offenders to see that they are
making moral choices to take action in response to others, and that when
they act—either to commit crimes or to restore victims—they are acting in
anticipation of particular responses of others. To be more concrete, a
woman offender who has passively participated in a robbery may be able to
see, for the first time, that the victim’s fear and subsequent months of
trauma is a direct result of her being present with the male offender. She
may, for the first time, come to see that something that she can offer to the
victim, whether monetary restoration, an apology, or even a recognition of
harm that she has caused, can actually help the victim to be freed from her
fear, desire for revenge, or even the guilt that victims experience. 173
Third, the participation of community and family members in restorative
processes can take in the element of larger moral responsibility that the
responsible self is always attuned to as she makes moral decisions for the
future, the reality that she is responding to and within a larger
community. 174 From these vantage points, the decisions about how to
conduct her life to repair the harms caused and reassure those who are
traumatized by her crime can potentially empower her as an agent, and a
responsible one. When confinement is deemed necessary, it is particularly
critical to follow such restorative processes with confinement that permits
such women to continue in relationship with their children is because this
permits parents to continue their journey toward a responsive and
responsible self. 175

ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 306-309 (discussing family group conferencing in families
with domestic abuse, and noting that both partner and child abuse, as well as typical abusive
controlling behavior, was significantly reduced after such conferencing).
172. See Olga Botcharova, Implementation of Track Two Diplomacy, in FORGIVENESS
AND RECONCILIATION: RELIGION, PUBLIC POLICY, & CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 281-83
(Raymond G. Helmick & Rodney L. Petersen eds., 2001).
173. See Minow, supra note 46, at 969 (noting that restorative justice helps victims move
beyond anger and powerlessness, and find the capacity to forgive).
174. See Gilligan, supra note 76, at 90, 100; Niebuhr, supra note 120, at 65.
175. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 19, at 379, 381-82 (describing the Family Unity
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Finally, restorative processes, which include the offender in their circle
of care, allow women offenders to be the objects of response by others who
express commitment and care for them altruistically, 176 without any motive
to use them to commit crimes. Restorative processes attempt to see women
offenders as valuable in their own right, not simply an extension of a male
intimate. Ideally, such processes can create in these women a sense that
they are in reciprocal solidarity with these others, not simply abandoned by
society and left to fend for themselves using their own devices, which
becomes neither an excuse for the past, nor a reality of the cause of future
crime.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued that restorative justice might be a valuable defining theme
for correctional approaches to women offenders, particularly those whose
offenses are closely tied to their relationships with male intimates.
Restorative processes accept the relational reality of many women’s lives,
the sense in which they understand relation as both essential to meaning in
their lives and potentially violative of the self-giving character which
informs both their needs and their attempts to lead responsible lives. With
other arguments, including Gilligan’s, these processes emphasize both the
“responsible” and the “self” of Niebuhr’s ethical demand, understanding
that the self cannot be accepted, actualized, indeed engendered, except in
response to individual others, including those others that constitute one’s
whole community.
By requiring women to accept their roles as responsible actors and as
objects of the responses of others in the very concrete way that the dialogue
of past action, current remorse, and future promise-giving occurs in
restorative processes, such processes accept women’s concrete relationality
as a positive given, while encouraging them to broaden their relations
beyond the small and suffocating circle in which they are trapped. They
require women to accept their role as agents, not simply subjects, and as
moral actors, not simply passive victims.
Beyond their relationships with their victims, the practicing of
responsible selfhood in the restorative process can teach women offenders
a lesson in their relationships with overpowering intimates as well. As they
Demonstration Project that keeps mothers and children together). Raeder notes that
Canadian officials have estimated that more than half of its female prison population could
be released and successfully reintegrated into the community with gender-appropriate
community services. Id. at 381.
176. See ZEHR, supra note 46, at 68 (noting that restorative processes address offenders’
needs, including the needs to be supported, treated respectfully, healed, and reintegrated).
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come to accept responsibility for their own wrongdoing, they can turn to
their intimates who have encouraged, enticed, or even threatened them into
crime, and demand an account of these men’s own responsibility for what
has happened, neither absolving themselves too cheaply for the wrong they
have caused, nor re-forming themselves into hapless women victims of
male Svengalis. With the power of the circle around them, the temptation
to give in to the force or charm with which male intimates reject their part
in harming others and the community can be suppressed. Within the power
of the circle, the dialogue of offender to offender, each acknowledging
simultaneous victimization and responsibility, holds out greater promise for
a life lived ethically in response to others, including the intimate circle of
lovers and children which so often survives the offender’s movement
through the criminal justice system.
This theme, as I have suggested, holds more concrete promise for our
coming to terms with what is possible for repeatedly broken individuals.
Far from over-promising the remaking of offenders into saints, or the
curing of pathologies that run deep in offender networks of relationship, the
restorative approach finds victory in the moment when an offender
acknowledges, with remorse, what harm she has done. Rather than
diminishing such a victory as small, the restorative movement suggests that
it is everything.
In so doing, the restorative movement teaches us a lesson as well. Those
who work out of existing themes of offender behavior and rehabilitation are
sorely tempted to adopt the view that criminal offenders, particularly
women offenders, are indeed “other,” so deviant that we cannot accept any
resemblance to them in our own lives. Whether they are sick and in need
of a cure, deficient and in need of skills, or glorified as deviants
challenging a cold and impersonal corrections system, the identification of
women offenders as deviants pleases our wish to find ourselves above
reproach in our own lives. In recognizing that the restorative paradigm
closely resembles the practice of repentance and forgiveness we call forth
from each other in the “free world,” we are forced to acknowledge that our
own offenses against each other are different perhaps in significant degree,
but not essentially in kind, from those for which we imprison offenders.
We are all offenders; we are all in need of the practice of repentance and
forgiveness, not only within the circle of victim and offender, but in every
circle we inhabit. To cast off the pretense that our lives are somehow
spotless as against one another, as we see offenders mimicking the
practices that we are exhorted to live, is itself a corrective to our own
corrections.

